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E-mail: amatsui@e.u-tokyo.ac.jp.Abstract: We develop a spatial model of competition between two policy-
motivated parties. Parties know a state of the world which determines which
policies are desirable for voters, while voters do not. The announced positions
of the parties serve as signals to the voters concerning the parties’ private
information. In all separating equilibria, when the left-wing party attains
power, the policies it implements are to the right of the policies implemented
by the right-wing party when it attains power. The intuition behind this
result is that when right-wing policies become more attractive, the left party
moves toward the right in order to be assured of winning, while the right-wing
party stays put in a radical stance.
Key words: spatial models, party competition, asymmetric information,
separating equilibria1 Introduction
Elections aggregate information dispersed among the public by allowing vot-
ers to express their opinions about the policy positions adopted by the parties.
However, the information available to the public might miss key facts in eco-
nomic or foreign policy issues that are available only to policymakers. Indeed,
while policymakers deal frequently with policy issues, for most other people
it is irrational to become politically well-informed (Downs [1957]). In such
a case, the welfare of society may increase if the policymakers convey their
private information to voters before the election. Policy proposals, therefore,
have two diﬀerent roles. One is to announce the parties’ positions to the
public so that voters can express their opinions and preferences. The other is
to send signals to voters regarding the parties’ private information. The ﬁrst
role has long been recognized in the literature inspired by Condorcet’s [1785]
Jury Theorem.1 The second role, on the other hand, has received much less
attention.2 It is this aspect of electoral competition we investigate in the
present paper.
If political parties are privately informed, there is no guarantee that they
will reveal their information to the public. Strategic manipulation may arise
when the preferences of parties and voters diﬀer. In the model we propose,
two parties with polarized preferences – a right-wing party and a left-wing
party – obtain information unobservable by the public and compete for oﬃce,
thus creating the possibility of such manipulation. It turns out that this
model generates “policy reversals,” i.e., situations in which the right-wing
1See, among others, Miller [1986], Grofman and Feld [1988], Young [1988], Ladha
[1992], and for a game-theoretic treatment, Austen-Smith and Banks [1996], Myerson
[1998], Feddersen and Pesendorfer [1997], and McLennan [1998].
2Harrington [1992, 1993], Roemer [1994], Schultz [1996], and Cukierman and Tommasi
[1998a,b] are a few exceptions.
1party implements left-leaning policies, and vice versa.
It is interesting to note that in a number of episodes important pol-
icy shifts have been supported by parties or candidates whose traditional
positions were to oppose such policies. The Nixon and Clinton administra-
tions have been considered by the media to be examples of policy reversals.3
Cases in point are market-oriented reforms in Latin America. Throughout
the region, radical trade liberalization and ﬁscal adjustment have been imple-
mented by the parties or candidates that had proved in the past a penchant
for populism and interventionism, such as Menem in Argentina, Fujimori in
Peru, and Paz Estenssoro in Bolivia, as pointed by Rodrik [1993].4 While
we do not commit to a particular interpretation of historic events, we oﬀer
a model in which leftists win when the underlying shock suggests right wing
policies, and vice versa.
Our model focuses on electoral competition between two equally informed
parties. The political parties have better information than the voting public
about the likely outcome of diﬀerent policies. Political parties are represented
as having distinct and polarized preferences on outcomes, and hence on poli-
cies.5 The utility of voters depends on the outcome of the policy adopted by
3For example, The Economist claims that Clinton governs like a Republican “just as
Nixon governed like a Democrat.” (“A Democratic Nixon?” November 2, 1996.) The
same parallel is drawn in Newsweek, November 16, 1998.
4We do not claim that every large policy shift has been conducted by political parties
having a record of opposing it. Clear counterexamples are the New Deal implemented
under F. D. Roosevelt and the increase in the military spending under Reagan. But the
episodes mentioned above raise the question of under which circumstances voters would
end up supporting a political party to implement a set of policies that appear to be far
from the party’s ideal policies rather than a political party whose ideology favors such
policies.
5The above assumption on parties’ preferences is not very realistic in two respects.
First, it is extreme to assume that their preferences are polarized. However, the qualitative
result would not change as long as the bliss points of the parties and the median voter are
aligned in the same order in every state of the world, i.e., the bliss point of the left-wing
2the winning party. The voters know exactly their preferences over outcomes,
but they do not know with certainty how policies relate to outcomes. The
parties simultaneously announce and commit to their policy platforms, after
obtaining some information about the correspondence between policies and
outcomes. The voters do not have the information that the parties obtained.
Instead, they observe the announced platforms and then decide which party
to vote for. The policy announced by the winning party is implemented.
The paper characterizes all equilibria of the game in which parties play
pure strategies. We distinguish two types of equilibria, pooling equilibria
and separating equilibria. In pooling equilibria, voters are unable to infer
the information held by the parties since neither party conditions its policy
announcements on the received information. In separating equilibria, vot-
ers are able to infer the information held by the parties from their policy
announcements, and use this information in order to decide which party to
support.
In all equilibria, the platform of the right-wing party is located to the
right of that of the left-wing party in every single election. That is, in every
election, policy platforms are ordered as we would expect from the ideological
positions of the parties. Separating equilibria, however, exhibit a paradoxical
feature: the right-wing party implements policies that are to the left of the
policies implemented by the left-wing party. Diﬀerent parties win in diﬀerent
states of the world.
In separating equilibria the information shared by the parties serves as
a correlation device for the parties’ policy platforms. There are two types
(resp. right-wing) party is to the left (resp. right) of that of the median voter. Second,
as discussed in Section 5, our results hold if parties care both about policies and about
winning the election, as long as the policy motivation is strong compared to the desire to
hold oﬃce.
3of separating equilibria, according to whether policy platforms are positively
correlated or negatively correlated with the “state of the world” (i.e. the
median voter’s preferred policy platform if voters learn the information held
by the parties). We focus the analysis on positive correlation equilibria. In all
positive correlation equilibria, the median voter supports the left-wing party
when the revealed information favors the adoption of right-leaning policies,
and vice versa. This result, together with some additional observations, gives
rise to the paradox of policy reversals.
Roughly speaking, the above result is supported as an equilibrium out-
come by the following location choices of the parties and belief formation of
the voters. Suppose that the signal favors the adoption of right-leaning policy
(the other case is similarly taken care of). In this case, the policy position of
the left-wing party is to the left of the median voter’s bliss point, while the
position of the right-wing party is to the right, and they are equally distant
from the bliss point. Although the median voter is indiﬀerent, in equilibrium
the left-wing party wins the election. If the right-wing party moves toward
the median voter’s bliss point, then the voters’ beliefs are changed so that
they put a positive probability on the other signal and still favor the posi-
tion of the left-wing party. The movement in the opposite direction does not
change the outcome. The left-wing party also has no incentive to move. If
it moves to the left, then it loses the election, and the opponent implements
the policy. It has no incentive to move to the right since it wins the election
anyway.
The logic behind the nonexistence of other separating equilibria with
positive correlation is complicated as there are many candidates for equilibria
that should be eliminated. In this introduction, we provide intuition for why
4the moderate wins for certain, i.e., the left-wing party wins with probability
one when the signal favors the adoption of right-leaning policies, and the
right-wing party wins in the opposite case.
Suppose, in an equilibrium with positive correlation, that the right-wing
party wins with positive probability when the signal favors the right-leaning
policies. We divide the argument into two cases. First, if this party’s policy
position is located to the right of the median voter’s bliss point, then the
left-wing party has an incentive to move towards the right just enough to
win the election for certain. In doing so, it does not have to worry about an
unfavorable shift of voters’ beliefs since they already have the worst beliefs
for the party.
Second, if the right-wing party is located either at the median voter’s bliss
point or to its left, then it wins the election for certain. In this case, the left-
wing party has an incentive to mislead the public by switching its platform
to the one that it would take when the realized signal favors the left-leaning
policies. Thus, in an equilibrium with positive correlation it cannot be the
case that the right-wing party wins with a positive probability if its favorite
state is realized.
We also analyze separating equilibria with negative correlation between
platforms and the state of the world. These equilibria are even more paradox-
ical: both the left-wing party and the right-wing party change their platforms
further to the left if the state of the world favors the adoption of right-leaning
policies, a possibility for which we strongly doubt there is a real life coun-
terpart. Indeed, we show that among separating equilibria only those with
positive correlation survive a requirement similar in ﬂavor to renegotiation-
proofness, which we call credibility. Credibility requires that no party an-
5nounces a platform which it would like to renege on after the election is over
and the median voter, a fortiori, a majority, would be willing to go along
with such a deviation from announced policy platforms.
We have clear-cut welfare implications when we measure welfare in terms
of the expected payoﬀ of the median voter. First, every separating equi-
librium with positive correlation leads to a higher expected payoﬀ for the
median voter than does any pooling equilibrium, which in turn leads to a
higher expected payoﬀ than does any separating equilibrium with negative
correlation. Moreover, among separating equilibria with positive correlation,
the farther the two implemented platforms are apart, the higher is the ex-
pected payoﬀ for the median voter. To the extent that they are best for
voters, we can consider separating equilibria to be focal.
It is useful to compare our work with that of Schultz [1996]. In a similar
model of competition between two informed parties, he obtains that sep-
arating equilibria necessarily entail full convergence of the parties’ policy
platforms to the median voter’s desired policy in each state of the world.
Separating equilibria only obtain if the preferences of at least one of the par-
ties are not too diﬀerent from those of the median voter, so that, say, even
the left party favors the adoption of right-wing policies when the state of the
world favors the adoption of such policies. The striking diﬀerence between
his results and ours has two sources. First, unlike Schultz, we assume that
there is some electoral uncertainty. This feature of our model, which we
deem realistic and in line with the previous literature on spatial competition,
precludes full convergence of the policy platforms in equilibrium as long as
parties are primarily policy-motivated. Second, Schultz restricts voters’ be-
liefs to be resistant to unilateral deviations in separating equilibria.6 This
6A similar reﬁnement is proposed by Bagwell and Ramey [1991] in a related multisender
6reﬁnement precludes the existence of separating equilibria without full con-
vergence such as those we study because at least one of the two parties is
tempted to deviate toward the median voter’s optimal policy. In our setting,
this reﬁnement would select pooling equilibria. We remain agnostic on re-
ﬁnements, and consider both pooling and separating equilibria as plausible
predictions.
It is also useful to compare our work with the work of Cukierman and
Tommasi, who ﬁrst built a model to explain policy reversals. Cukierman and
Tommasi [1998a] explain policy reversals in a context in which the incumbent
government, but not the challenger, has better information than voters about
the relation between policies and outcomes. In a related paper, Cukierman
and Tommasi [1998b] explain policy reversals in the context that the party
in power must submit a policy proposal to a referendum. In both cases, the
driving force of their result is that voters are willing to accept right-leaning
policies only when they are proposed by a left-wing incumbent: “if even the
left-wing party favors the rightward shift, we must favor it too.” For this ar-
gument to work, it must be the case that the policy reversal is observed only
when there is an extreme shock so that even the incumbent prefers to move
in the direction it normally dislikes. Cukierman and Tommasi note that the
credibility of a policy (that is, how appropriate people think is a policy given
their beliefs about the state of the world) depends on the ideological identity
of the policy maker proposing it, as well as on the policy he proposes. The
setup of our model is diﬀerent from theirs in that we have two informed par-
ties competing for the electorate. Both parties commit to policy platforms
before the election, while in Cukierman and Tommasi [1998a] only the in-
signalling game.
7formed party (the incumbent) has to commit and the competition between
parties play no role. In our model, policy reversals are observed even when
the most preferred policy of the left-wing party is unambiguously tilted to
the left. Reversals occur not because everyone likes it, but because one of the
two parties reluctantly moves toward the policies it dislikes in order to win
the election. Cukierman and Tommasi’s account of policy reversals seems
more appropriate to explain the case of a winning candidate who chooses a
surprising policy, while our account is perhaps more appropriate when par-
ties move their positions before an election in the direction most preferred
by the eventual loser.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 builds a model with
the features described above. The model is an extension of the Wittman-
Calvert model in which parties, but not voters, are informed of an unknown
state that aﬀects the desirability of policies. Section 3 characterizes and
discusses pooling equilibria. Section 4 does a similar analysis for separating
equilibria. Section 5 presents some extensions. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Model
Consider a society with two parties, denoted by L and R, and a number of
voters. They play an election game. In the beginning, nature chooses one of
two possible states, −1 and 1. We assume that both states occur with the
same probability. After observing the state, the two parties simultaneously
propose a platform, given by a real number. In the next stage, voters vote
for one of the two parties. Before they vote, they observe the platforms of
the parties but not the state of nature. The party that obtains the majority
of the votes wins the election and carries out the proposed platform.
8If the state is s = −1,1, and if the implemented policy is located at x,
then the outcome y is assumed to be given by
y = x − s.
Thus, the policy position x = s always induces the outcome y = 0.
We assume that all voters have symmetric, single-peaked preferences on
the outcome space. That is, for every voter there is an ideal outcome, and
the utility of the voter is strictly decreasing in the distance from his or her
ideal and the actual outcome. To keep matters simple, we assume that voters
vote sincerely. Since the outcome space is one-dimensional and voters have
single-peaked preferences, all that matters for the analysis is the vote of
the median voter. The ideal outcome for the median voter is 0. Thus, if
the proposed platform of the winning party is x ∈ <, and if the state is s
(s = −1,1), then the median voter’s payoﬀ function v(x,s) is single-peaked
and symmetric around s. Voters are expected payoﬀ maximizers.
Parties L and R have lexicographic preferences. They ﬁrst care about
the outcome of the actual implemented policy irrespective of which party
is elected. If the payoﬀs from the chosen policies are identical, each party
prefers winning the election to losing it. The (ﬁrst-order) payoﬀ functions for
Party L and Party R are uL(x,s) and uR(x,s), respectively. For the sake of
simplicity, we keep symmetry by assuming uL(−δ,s) = uR(δ,s) for all δ for
s = −1,1. We assume further that uL(x,s) is strictly concave and strictly
decreasing in x, a fortiori, uR(x,s) is strictly concave and strictly increasing
in x. That is, Party L always prefers outcomes to the left and Party R always
9prefers outcomes to the right.7 Moreover, both parties are risk-averse.8 A
simple example would be uL(x,s) = 1 − ex and uR(x,s) = 1 − e−x for
s = −1,1.
Our equilibrium concept is a variant of perfect Bayesian equilibrium in
which voters’ beliefs are required to satisfy Bayes’ law on the equilibrium path
and each party’s action is required to be optimal not only against the vot-
ers’ equilibrium strategy, but also against strategies close to this equilibrium
strategy. These trembles correspond to some (arbitrarily) small uncertainty
about how voters would vote, which turns out to preclude complete conver-
gence of policy platforms in equilibrium.9 We focus on the equilibria in which
the parties use pure strategies but the median voter does not necessarily do
so.
The above restrictions reduce our description of an equilibrium, or in














the platform proposed by Party P = L,R when it receives the signal −1
(respectively 1). Next, µ : <2 → [0,1] is a belief system which maps the
proposed platforms of the two parties to the voters’ subjective probability
of the true state’s being −1. Finally, q : <2 → [0,1] is the strategy of the
median voter: q(xL,xR) is the probability of Party L’s winning when Parties
L and R propose xL and xR, respectively.
7Our results will not change if we assume that Party L and Party R have bliss points
to the left and to the right of the median voter’s, but we prefer to save on notation and
length of the proofs.
8With polarized risk-neutral parties, information transmission from parties to voters
eﬀectively requires voters to have some information of their own; see e.g. the arbitration
model of Gibbons [1988] and related models, such as Martinelli [1999].
9We use trembles only for the voting strategies. Note that trembling hand perfection
deﬁned by Selten [1975] cannot be applied to this game directly since there are a continuum









R),µ,q) constitutes an equilibrium if the follow-
ing three conditions hold:
• (optimality of parties’ strategies) there exists a sequence {qk} of func-
tions from <2 into (0,1) that converges uniformly to q such that for






























































































R) = 0; and






















L(xL,xR) = µ(xL,xR)v(xL,−1) + (1 − µ(xL,xR))v(xL,1), and
E
µ
R(xL,xR) = µ(xL,xR)v(xR,−1) + (1 − µ(xL,xR))v(xR,1).
In this deﬁnition, E
µ
P(xL,xR) is the expected payoﬀ of the median voter
if Party P = L,R wins and implements xP. We will say that an equilibrium









R hold. Conversely, we will say that an








R (or both) holds. On
the equilibrium path, there is no updating of beliefs if the equilibrium is
pooling, and there is a complete transmission of information from parties to
voters if the equilibrium is separating. Note that no restriction is imposed
on voters’ beliefs other than they are correct on the equilibrium path.
Before we go to each class of equilibria, it is worthwhile to mention the
following lemma. It states that for each signal (i.e., in every election) the
platform proposed by the left-wing party is to the left of the one proposed
by the right-wing party. No policy reversal is observed in any single election.






















R, then the party
that wins with a positive probability has an incentive to deviate. Suppose
that Party L wins with a positive probability. Then by setting its policy
at x
−
R, it obtains x
−













































for any qk(·,·) ∈ (0,1) and any x0
L < x
−
L. Therefore, the ﬁrst equilibrium
condition (perfection) is violated, i.e., one cannot ﬁnd a sequence qk for
which incentive constraints are satisﬁed. Other cases are proven in the same
12manner.
Note that, according to the lemma, no equilibrium in the model exhibits
full convergence. The fact that uncertainty about voters’ responses leads to
departures from full convergence when parties are policy-oriented has been
well understood since the work of Wittman [1983] and Calvert [1985]. Our
lemma extends their results to a situation in which voters’ beliefs about the
correspondence between policies and outcomes are inﬂuenced by the policies
proposed by the parties.
3 Pooling equilibria
In these equilibria, Parties L and R make diﬀerent proposals from each other,
say, xL and xR, respectively, but each of them sticks to the same platform
regardless of the state. Hence, no information is revealed to voters on the
equilibrium path. Parties stick to a given platform because voters interpret
any deviation as evidence against the deviating party. Thus, no information is
transmitted from parties to voters. The existence of uninformative equilibria
is standard in the context of signaling games, and it does not depend on the
particular features of the model we propose, other than the fact that we do
not impose any restriction on out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
We claim the following:
Proposition 1. ((xL,xL),(xR,xR),µ,q) is an equilibrium for some µ and q
if and only if xL < xR and one of the following three conditions is satisﬁed:
(i) −1 ≤ (xL + xR)/2 ≤ 1, and xR ≤ 1;
(ii) −1 ≤ (xL + xR)/2 ≤ 1, and xL ≥ −1;
13(iii) xL = −1 − δ, xR = 1 + δ for some δ > 0, and, for s = −1,1,




A typical pooling equilibrium outcome in terms of policy positions is de-
scribed in Figure 1. Note that in all pooling equilibria the left-wing party’s
platform is to the left of the median voter’s ideal point, given that no infor-





Figure 1: Pooling equilibrium (i)
Proof. To show the if-part, we assume the condition and ﬁnd appropriate





1 if xL + xR > 0,
1/2 if xL + xR = 0,
0 if xL + xR < 0.










L = xL, x0
R 6= xR,
0 if x0
L 6= xL, x0
R = xR,
1/2 otherwise.
10This is an extreme belief system. In general, we can construct more realistic belief
systems in which beliefs change “gradually” as platforms change.
14Values of q(·,·) for out-of-equilibrium platforms are easily obtained from the
assumed beliefs.
In case (i), whenever Party L deviates, the outcome will be either xR
or something that is to the right of xR. Thus, Party L has no incentive to
deviate. Party R has no incentive to deviate, either. Indeed, if the party
deviates, voters believe that the state is −1, and in order to beat Party L,
Party R has to move to the left if it is to win with positive probability in the
equilibrium, in which case it is worse oﬀ. The proof of perfection is relegated
to Appendix 1.
Case (ii) is the mirror image of case (i). In case (iii), an alternative
for Party L is to set its platform just to the right of 1 − δ to obtain the
median voter’s support with probability one. The condition stated in (iii)
implies that this deviation does not give the party a higher payoﬀ. The same
argument holds for Party R.
To show the only-if-part, note ﬁrst that xL < xR is guaranteed by the
lemma. Suppose that (xL + xR)/2 < −1. Then Party R has an incentive to
switch to xR+ε for a suﬃciently small ε > 0. For any belief, xR+ε is strictly
preferred to xL by the median voter. Therefore, Party R does not fail to win
and obtains something better than before. The case of (xL + xR)/2 > 1 is
similarly taken care of.
Next, suppose that xR > 1 and xL < −1 without satisfying xL + xR = 0.
Consider the case xL+xR < 0 ﬁrst. In this case, xR is preferred to xL by the
median voter. Then Party L has an incentive to move to a platform between
1 and xR. By this movement, it can capture the median voter under any
belief, and it is better oﬀ. In case xL + xR > 0, Party R has an incentive to
deviate for a similar reason.
15Finally, suppose that xL = −1 − δ, xR = 1 + δ for some δ > 0, but we
have the reverse of the strict inequality of (iii), i.e.,




for some s. In this case, in state s Party L has an incentive to set its platform
just right of 1−δ to obtain the median voter’s support with probability one.
The above inequality now implies that this deviation gives the party a higher
payoﬀ.
4 Separating equilibria
These equilibria exhibit a paradoxical phenomenon: the policy platform car-
ried out by the right-wing party is located to the left of the policy platform
carried out by the left-wing one. Note that Lemma 1 is still valid, namely,
in each state of the world, Party R proposes a platform which is to the right









When we compare the platforms of the winning parties across time, Party
L’s platform is located to the right of Party R’s platform.
The set of separating equilibria can be divided into two subclasses, de-
pending on whether the implemented policy and the state of nature are
positively or negatively correlated. We consider the two subclasses in that
order. For reasons that will become apparent later on, our main focus is on
equilibria with positive correlation.
4.1 Separating equilibria with positive correlation
In these equilibria, Party L wins the election with probability one if s = 1,
i.e., if the state of the world favors the adoption of right-leaning policies,
16and Party R wins if s = −1. In other words, the “wrong” party wins every
election. Voters, however, beneﬁt from the fact that the policy platforms
of both parties are positively correlated with the state of the world. The
discussion in Section 5 shows that these equilibria are the best in terms of
the median voter’s welfare.
It might be useful to provide some intuition about why separating equi-
libria with positive correlation necessarily exhibit such policy reversals. In
positive correlation equilibria, the party that most dislikes the policies im-
plied by the state of the world is forced to play as a moderate because of
the knowledge that the other party will play as a radical, and vice versa, the
party that plays as a radical will do so because of the knowledge that its
opponent will be a moderate. That is, both parties’ policy positions move in
the same direction, left or right, because the state of the world serves as a
correlation device for their strategies.
As is usually the case in models of electoral competition, we can imagine
that the attempt to win the election (thus, ensuring the adoption of more
desirable policies than those espoused by their opponents) will push both
parties in a separating equilibrium to converge toward the optimal policy for
the median voter – that is, the state of the world. In our model, however,
there is a countervailing force: voters use policy positions to make inferences
about the state of the world. Thus, if Party L moves towards the right this
is interpreted as evidence of the state of the world being 1, and if Party R
moves toward the left this is interpreted as evidence on the contrary. For
the party playing as a radical, moving towards the true state of the world
risks convincing voters that the opposite state of the world is more likely.
However, for the party playing as a moderate, voters’ beliefs are already the
17worst possible ones: that is why it is behaving as a moderate in the ﬁrst
place. Hence, it is “less costly” for the moderate to converge to the optimal
policy for the swing voter. In equilibrium, the moderate party will move its
policy position close enough to the state of the world to win the election,
knowing that at some point the radical party will give up on getting closer:
before convincing voters that the state of the world is more likely to be on
the opposite side of the political spectrum.








R) satisfy the following for






























L,−1) + (1 − q∗)uR(x
+
R,−1).






















R), µ, q) is an equilibrium.
A typical situation looks like the one in Figure 2. Appendix 3 shows the
set of (symmetric) separating equilibria with positive correlation for the case
uL(x,s) = 1 − ex and uR(x,s) = 1 − e−x for s = −1,1.








R) = 0 be the beliefs on the





























R) = 1. Next, let
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Such a µ∗ exists between zero and one due to Conditions (i) and (ii) and the
assumption that v(x,s) is single-peaked at s. We will prove that Party L
does not have an incentive for a unilateral deviation. The incentive constraint
for Party R is checked in the same manner. Suppose ﬁrst that the state is






R) = 0 holds,
and x
−
R is still chosen. If, on the other hand, it moves to the right of x
−
R,
there will be no gain, either. Suppose next that the state is 1. There is no
incentive to move further right. If it moves to x0
L < x
+






























R) = µ∗, and equation (1) implies the median





R) = q∗. Then, Condition (iii) implies that Party L has no incentive
to choose x
−
L if the state is 1. The proof of perfection is relegated to Appendix
2.
Next, we show that there exists at least some separating equilibria char-

















R = −ε, x
+
L = ε,





R are given by
x
−
L = −2 + ε, x
+
R = 2 − ε,
respectively. Note that Conditions (i) and (ii) are satisﬁed for any suﬃciently
small ε > 0. Let q∗ = 1/2. Condition (v) is simply assumed. It now suﬃces
to show that (iii) and (iv) hold for a suﬃciently small ε > 0. Due to the strict













uL (−2 + ε,1) +
1
2
uL (2 − ε,1)
holds for a suﬃciently small ε > 0. Condition (iii) is proven. Condition (iv)
is the mirror image of (iii) and satisﬁed for the same ε.
204.2 Separating equilibria with negative correlation
These equilibria are even more paradoxical than those with positive corre-
lation. In these equilibria, the right-wing party wins the election when the
state of the world favors right-leaning policies, and the left-wing party when
the state of the world favors left-leaning policies. However, both parties shift
their policy platforms to the left if the state of the world favors the adoption
of right-leaning policies. Hence, the “correct” party wins the election, but it
does so with the “wrong” policy platform. As a result, the median voter may
end up being worse oﬀ than in an equilibrium in which no information held
by the parties is revealed (see Section 5). The discussion in Section 5 shows
that these equilibria do not satisfy a requirement related to the credibility of
parties’ commitment to their electoral platforms.
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Figure 3: Separating equilibrium: negative correlation case








R) = 0, be the beliefs on the
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This µ∗∗ is between zero and one due to Conditions (i)’ and (ii)’ above and
the assumption that v(x,s) is single-peaked at s. For this value of µ∗∗, the









R), in particular, q∗∗, is consistent with the equilibrium condition. As
in the previous case, it is veriﬁed that there exists at least some separating
equilibria as characterized above.
224.3 Nonexistence of other separating equilibria
Proposition 4. There are no separating equilibria other than those de-
scribed by Propositions 2 and 3.








R),µ,q∗) is a separating equilibrium.








R. We divide our analysis




R holds. This corresponds to
the case of positive correlation equilibria. Recall its equilibrium conditions









R)/2 > 1 holds, then when the signal
is 1, L has an incentive to deviate to x
+
L − ε for a small ε > 0 and win the




R)/2 < 1 holds, then
R will win the election with its platform x
+
R when s = 1. In this case, in









must be zero. However, if this is the case, then R would have an incentive








R)/2 < 1 cannot




R)/2 = −1 should hold. Condition (ii) is








R) > 0) holds,
then L (respectively R) has an incentive to move its platform toward the
right (respectively left) by a suﬃciently small ε > 0 and win the election for
sure. This establishes Condition (v). If (iii) is violated, then L switches to
x
−
L when it gets s = 1. Similarly, if (iv) is violated, then R switches to x
+
R








R) < 1, then R
switches to x
−




R) > 0, then
L switches to x
+
L when it gets s = −1. Thus, at least one of them has an
incentive to deviate, which establishes Condition (i). Hence, all Conditions









R holds. This corresponds to the negative correlation
case. First of all, Condition (i)’ holds by the assumption and the lemma. To




R)/2 < −1 holds. Then, R has an
incentive to move its platform toward the right by a suﬃciently small ε > 0.




R)/2 > 1 holds, then L has an incentive to
move its platform toward the left by ε > 0. If (iii)’ does not hold, then L has
an incentive to switch to x
+
L when the signal is −1. Similarly, if (iv)’ does
not hold, then R switches to x
−
R when the signal is 1. Finally, if Condition
(v)’ is violated, it implies that the median voter does not vote for his favorite
platform. Hence, Conditions (i)’-(v)’ are necessary.
5 Further Remarks
5.1 Welfare
If we identify welfare with the payoﬀ to the median voter, we can state the
following for the special but important case in which the median voter has
Euclidean preferences (i.e. v(x,s) = −|x − s|):
Proposition 5. Welfare is higher in separating equilibria with positive
correlation than in any other equilibrium.
Indeed, in separating equilibria with positive correlation the median voter’s












11Note that we require the inequalities in (iii) and (iv) to hold strictly. Some slack
between the LHS and the RHS of the inequalities is required in order to satisfy the ﬁrst
equilibrium condition, as it is clear from Appendix 2. The same holds true with respect
to Conditions (iii)’ and (iv)’.




L < 1, the median
voter’s expected payoﬀ is greater than −1. In separating equilibria with
















L < 1, the expected
payoﬀ is smaller than −1. Finally, if a pooling equilibrium satisﬁes either
(i) or (ii) of Section 3, the expected payoﬀ is −1, while if it satisﬁes (iii),
the expected payoﬀ is −1 − δ where δ is positive. Thus, if one of the best
equilibria is played, policy reversals are necessarily observed. We can consider
separating equilibria with positive correlation to be “focal” to the extent that
they are the best for voters.
5.2 Credibility of commitment
In separating equilibria, the information shared by the parties about the state
of nature serves as a signal leading to correlated play by the parties. However,
a subclass of separating equilibria exhibit the seemingly unnatural feature of
a negative correlation between policy platforms and the state of nature. Note
that negative correlation equilibria require the left-wing party, if it wins, to
pursue a policy platform that is to the right of the state of the world. (The
opposite happens if the right-wing party wins.) Hence, both the winning
party and the median voter could be made better oﬀ if the party in oﬃce
were allowed to renegotiate its policy platform. Our commitment assumption
becomes suspect in these equilibria because it does not seem reasonable to
assume that voters would punish a party for a move that would beneﬁt them.
This leads one to think that a sensible requirement to ask of an equilibrium
is that commitment should be credible in the sense that in case of winning
25a party would not modify its policy platform even if the median voter were
willing to go along with such a decision.




































In words, we say that an equilibrium is credible if, after the election is over
and regardless of the result of the election, there is no policy platform diﬀerent
from the one prescribed by the equilibrium that makes both the winning
party and the median voter better oﬀ. In separating equilibria, the credibility








R ≥ 1. It is easy to
see that
Proposition 6. Separating equilibria with positive correlation are credible,
while separating equilibria with negative correlation are not.
(With respect to pooling equilibria, credibility imposes the further con-
straint on Conditions (i) and (ii) that xL ≤ 0,xR ≥ 0.)
5.3 A larger number of states
We think that a model with two possible signal values is a good representation
of the situations in which parties (and especially voters) can only get a rough
idea of the direction in which policy should be moving, for instance, low state
intervention in the economy versus pervasive intervention (Harrington [1993]
makes a similar point). Moreover, it is possible to extend some of our results
to a situation with a larger number of states. Suppose that there is a number
26of intermediate states between −1 and 1, and keep the assumption that the
probability that the state is less than zero is 1/2. Deﬁne a semiseparating
equilibrium as one in which the right-wing party and the left-wing party




L, respectively, whenever the state is less




L, respectively, whenever the state is
larger than or equal to 0. Following the steps of Proposition 2, it is possible


















R = 2+ε with q∗ = 1/2, where ε
is chosen to be suﬃciently small. Note that if there are intermediate states
then the median voter is no longer indiﬀerent between the two parties in










(If there are intermediate states, semiseparating equilibria other than those
described by Conditions (i) to (iv) of Proposition 2 and even completely
separating equilibria might exist.)
5.4 Downsian parties
Note that our payoﬀ speciﬁcation for the parties downplays the traditional
Downsian motivation for getting elected: holding oﬃce per se. If parties
were primarily oﬃce-motivated in this sense, there would be some pooling
equilibria with full convergence in which both parties would have a positive
probability of winning the election as long as both played according to the
equilibrium strategy.
Separating equilibria with full convergence in either or both states, how-













R = −1, Party R would have an
incentive to “mislead” voters by adopting policy x
+
R whenever the true state
of the world is −1, and this should not decrease its probability of winning
the election; for if not, Party L would increase its probability of winning the
election by adopting policy x
−
L whenever the true state of the world is 1.
If parties are exclusively oﬃce-motivated, then separating equilibria dis-
appear. To see this, assume that the parties try to maximize their respective
winning probabilities. Take a separating equilibrium of the original game.
We know that (i) Party R wins at s = −1, (ii) Party L wins at s = 1, and if,




L) is an announced pair, either one of them (or
both), say, L wins with a positive probability. Then Party L has an incentive
to deviate to x
+
L at state s = −1.
More generally, it is shown that there exist some separating equilibria if
policy-orientation is relatively strong compared to power-orientation. To see
this point, let ui(·,·) and wi(·,·) be the payoﬀs of Party i = L,R when it wins
the election and when it loses the election, respectively. Assume symmetry
between L and R as before. Also, assume the continuity of these functions
with respect to their ﬁrst argument. In order to destroy the incentive for
Party L to deviate at s = −1, Party L has to prefer x
−
R implemented by
Party R to a mixture between that and x
+
L implemented by itself. The
former gives Party L the payoﬀ of wL(x
−

























L to be equilibrium actions. Thus, in order for some separating
equilibrium to exist, we must have
wL(−1,−1) > uL(1,−1).
It is easy to verify that other incentives for deviations can be eliminated
by appropriately choosing the belief system µ. For instance, we can specify
µ(x,x
−
R) = 1 for x > x
−
R so that it never pays for the left party to deviate
to the right of x
−
R, regardless of its love for oﬃce. Therefore, the above
condition turns out to be a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence
of separating equilibria with policy reversals when parties are oﬃce-motivated
as well as policy-motivated.
6 Conclusion
We present a spatial model of electoral competition with asymmetric infor-
mation between parties and voters. We describe the complete set of equilibria
in which parties follow pure strategies, and show that, when parties get to
observe one of two possible signals, one favoring the adoption of left-leaning
policies and the other favoring the adoption of right-leaning policies, all sep-
arating equilibria exhibit policy reversals. That is, the policies implemented
by the left-wing party when it wins the election are located to the right of the
policies implemented by the right-wing party. Reversals are observed only
across elections: in each election, the platform proposed by the left party is
located to the left of that proposed by the right party. The model shows,
then, that policy reversals are possible whenever: (i) there is uncertainty
among voters about which is the best policy course, and adopting the best
policy course may involve a substantial policy shift, (ii) political parties share
29some relevant information that voters lack, which may serve as a correlating
device for their policy platforms, and (iii) parties are policy-oriented and
have polarized ideological preferences.
Formally, the model we develop is a multi-sender signaling game. Ap-
plications of such games are still relatively sparse. Our paper illustrates
that they might be useful to analyze electoral competition, with potentially
surprising results.
30Appendix 1
This appendix establishes that the pooling equilibria described by Propo-
sition 1 satisfy the ﬁrst equilibrium condition. We consider explicitly case
(i), with xL + xR < 0 (see Figure 1). All other cases are analogous.
According to the speciﬁed beliefs, if both parties propose their equilibrium
actions, voters believe that the two states are equally likely (and vote for
Party R). If only Party L deviates, voters will believe that the state of the








L < xR or x0
L > 2 − xR,
1/2 if x0
L = xR or x0
L = 2 − xR,
1 if xR < x0
L < 2 − xR.
(To save on notation, we let q(·,·) = 1/2 if the voters are indiﬀerent between
the two parties and the equilibrium does not require them to randomize in a
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εk if xL ≤ x0
L < xR or x0
L > 2 − xR,
1/2 if x0
L = xR or x0
L = 2 − xR,
1 − εk if xR < x0
L < 2 − xR.
for k = 1,2,··· and some ε ∈ (0,1). The sequence qk(·,·) converges uniformly
to q(·,·) since uL(x0
L,s) − uL(xR,s) is bounded away from zero. With this
sequence, it is veriﬁed that for each s, for each k and for any x0
L ∈ <
q











and the equality implies qk(xL,xR) ≥ qk(x0
L,xR).
31Similarly, if only Party R deviates, voters will believe that the state of








R = xR or |x0
R + 1| < |xL + 1|,
1/2 if x0
R = xL or x0
R = −2 − xL,
1 if x0
R 6= xR and |x0
R + 1| > |xL + 1|.
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εk if x0
R = xR or |x0
R + 1| < |xL + 1|,
1/2 if x0
R = xL or x0
R = −2 − xL,
1 − εk if x0
R < xR and |x0
R + 1| > |xL + 1|,









for k = 1,2,··· and some ε ∈ (0,1/2). The sequence qk(xL,·) converges
uniformly to q(xL,·). With this sequence, it is veriﬁed that for each s, for
each k and for any x0
R ∈ <
q











Finally, when both parties deviate, voters believe that the two states are






This appendix establishes that the separating equilibria described by
Propositions 2 and 3 satisfy the ﬁrst equilibrium condition. We consider
explicitly a separating equilibrium with positive correlation as described by
Proposition 2 (see Figure 2). The proof for a separating equilibrium with
negative correlation is analogous.
For the sake of brevity, we restrict our attention to Party L. Suppose
ﬁrst that the state is s = 1. To check the ﬁrst equilibrium condition for the
present case, let q(x0
L,x
+
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Note that this is consistent with other equilibrium conditions. To check the
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for k = 1,2,··· and some ε > 0 satisfying










(Condition (iii) implies that the RHS of the above inequality is strictly pos-
itive). The sequence qk(·,x
+
R) converges uniformly to q(·,x
+
R). Moreover, it
veriﬁes the Party L’s optimality condition.
33The case in which the state is s = −1 is simpler. Let q(x0
L,x
−
R) = 0 for
all x0































R). Moreover, it veriﬁes the Party L’s optimality condition.
In the spirit of (trembling hand) perfection, we just oﬀer one possible
sequence of strategies for the median voter converging to his equilibrium
strategy. Of course, there are other sequences of strategies for the median












































That is, if Party L deviates toward the left of its equilibrium platform, the
median voter is very unlikely to vote for it. This makes sense: the further
to the left is Party L’s platform, the more costly it is for the median voter
to vote for Party L by mistake, if the median voter believes that the state






L, and for any given




L. A simple example of trembles is provided
in Appendix 3.
34Appendix 3
We calculate here the set of symmetric separating equilibria with positive
correlation for the example uL(x,s) = 1 − ex and uR(x,s) = 1 − e−x for
s = −1,1. From Conditions (i) to (iv) in Proposition 2, with q∗ = 1/2, we
obtain that the policy platforms corresponding to this set of equilibria are
given by x
−
L = −1 − α, x
−
R = −1 + α, x
+
L = 1 − α, and x
+
R = 1 + α for
α ∈ (1
2 ln(2 − e−2),1), where 1
2 ln(2 − e−2) ≈ 0.31154. These equilibria are
supported by q(·,·) as given in Appendix 2. From uL(x,s) < 1 for s = −1,1
and α > 1
2 ln(2 − e−2) we can obtain that for any symmetric separating
























Thus, the optimality of Party L’s equilibrium strategy in any such equi-
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for k = 1,2,···, some K ≤ (e2 − 1)/(2e2 − 1), and  small enough to sat-
isfy equation (3). We can deal similarly with the optimality of Party R’s
equilibrium strategy.
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